The Hindenburg Disaster
A Compelling Theory of Probable Cause and Effect
By Addison
Bain, PH.D.
The research examined the disaster of the airship Hindenburg,
which occurred at Lakehurst, New Jersey, on May 6, 1937.
For nearly 60 years, the prevailing hypothesis has been
that the Hindenburg's hydrogen gas used for buoyancy was the basic design
flaw. Two separate boards of inquiry each rationalized the premise of
two sets of conditions to justify the cause, namely the presence of
free hydrogen and the subsequent presence of an ignition source. The
investigation process in each case proceeded down the path of rationalizing
the most credible reason for free hydrogen to materialize and then to
rationalize the most credible source of ignition. Although the airship
wreakage was examined, nothing could be found to conclusively support
any other rationalization. Limited experimental testing was done (such
as gas cell conductivity) but nothing conclusive was reported at the
time that would question the airship design. Eyewitness accounts and
photographic coverage constituted the principal evidence for the investigation.
Numerous theories were postulated by outside sources as
well as the American and German investigative teams. These were all
categorized and reviewed. In the final reports, the Hindenburg envelope
was never mention as being suspect. In a newspaper account at the time
and then later, as a article in a magazine, a Ralph Upson, inventor
of the metalclad airship, did question the use of fabrics for airships
in hydrogen service. A Professor Max Dieckmann later conducted fabric
test comparisons but this was oriented toward electrostatic conductivity.
The question the research effort is intended to address
is based on the author's examination of the original film footage and
other documentary evidence in an attempt to explain certain conspicuous
observations as follows.
1. The Hindenburg did not explode, but burned very rapidly
in omni-directional patterns.
2. The 240-ton airship maintained trim many seconds after
the fire initiated.
3. Falling pieces of fabric were aflame and not self-extinguishing.
4. The inferno colorization is characteristic of a forest
fire, not a hydrogen fire, as experienced by the author.
The purpose of the study was prompted by these suspicious
events. It appeared hydrogen may not have been the initiating factor,
thus perhaps, leading to a different theory than that established in
1937. The public may have been misled to assume the disaster as solely
a hydrogen fire. If it was not, then the misconception maintains a negative
image about the use of hydrogen.
Finally, the purpose of this study was to conclude that
the Hindenburg disaster was a result of the frailty of human engineering
not unlike the Titanic, Space Shuttle Challenger and similar disasters.
The initial approach to the study (1990) was to conduct
an exhaustive review of the literature and make contacts with airship
experts and airship historians. The focus was on airship materials and
the author was suspicious of the fabric covering, having learned that
a cellulose nitrate dope with powdered aluminum was perhaps used on
the Hindenburg. The former chemical is the basis of gunpowder and the
latter a fuel component used in solid rocket motors.
During the fall of 1995 and throughout 1996, a number
of unexpected events occurred which dramatically revealed sources of
significant information and complemented the course of the study. Fabric
samples were provided from an individual that had been stationed at
Lakehurst, fabric samples were provided also by collectors (or purchased
from them), and the interviews were conducted with survivors and eyewitnesses.
The NASA Materials Science Laboratories at the Kennedy Space Center
offered analytical services. The pinnacle of the study occurred when
the author was provided the unprecedented opportunity (for an American)
to examine files an the Zeppelin Archive in Friedrichshafen, Germany.
The Zeppelin works and new Zeppelin museum were visited.
The overall results indicated two primary conclusive aspects.
First, the prevailing atmospheric conditions and the unorthodox method
of landing at Lakehurst could prompt severe electrostatic discharge
activity on the airship. This factor is consistent with the original
conclusion concerning the ignition source. The unpredictable behavior
and consequence or various forms of atmospheric electrical activity
is embraced by modern experts of static electricity, the experiences
of airline pilots and solid propellant rocket motor (SRM) scientist's
expert in electrostatic discharge or ESD as they call it. Secondly,
the lacquer doped fabric envelope of the airship was tested and found
to be very flammable and could be successfully ignited using electrical
arc sources. The materials used in the makeup of the envelope, other
airship construction materials and the hydrogen used for buoyancy all
could have contributed to the resulting conflagration.
Evidence that further supports the conclusion includes
examination of the design of LZ-130 (Hindenburg sister ship). This research
revealed design changes (after the Hindenburg disaster) in an apparent
attempt to counteract static buildup and reduce the flammability of
the LZ-130 airship hull. Unpublished German tests, uncovered by the
research, also substantiate the severe flammability of the Hindenburg
envelope when subjected to electrostatic discharge.
During 1998 copy of the FBI report (1937, 337 pages) was
acquired. The FBI basically followed up on inquires surrounding potential
sabotage. Nothing conclusive was found. The conclusion by Hoehling was
characterized by the FBI as, "pure speculation". The "evidence"
by Mooney proves false.
